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the use of effects-based operations (EBO) within the Department of Defense (DOD), despite the fact that EBO has had success in past operations. At the same time, other nations such as China are rapidly expanding their military capability and are developing new anti-access weapons and technologies which could potentially deny us the ability to project power around the world. This paper examines the nature of a maritime anti-access environment, using China as an example, and demonstrates how EBO can aid the Joint Force Commander (JFC) in planning and executing operations in such a scenario by examining several successful examples of EBO employment in the past. It briefly discusses the nature of both EBO and anti-access strategies, and follows up with an analysis of how EBO could make a difference in planning and executing operations in an anti-access environment.
INTRODUCTION

An "effect" is the physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect
-JP 3-0
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not been seriously challenged by a militarily powerful enemy. While our conflicts have by no means been easy or simple, they
have not been against a technologically advanced adversary with the capability to bring a credible military force to bear and challenge us on the battlefield. However, this may change in the near future if predictions are accurate. 2 The United States may find itself engaged in conflict with a foe that has developed a robust anti-access (also known as access denial)
strategy that would seek to prevent our ability to project power and to operate relatively unhindered as we have routinely done since World War II. How would the Joint Force Commander (JFC) determine courses of action (COA) that would have the greatest likelihood of achieving our strategic and operational goals while at the same time using an economy of force? How would the JFC plan for operations in such an environment? The answer to these two questions is effects-based operations (EBO), a concept that helps commanders and planners think in terms of creating effects on the enemy, rather than simply focusing on destroying the enemy. EBO can be an extremely useful tool for the commander when planning and operating in an anti-access environment.
While EBO is not a new concept, it has only more recently come to the forefront following Operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield, 3 and has been embroiled in controversy and While there is a considerable body of literature that suggests that EBO is fundamentally flawed and difficult (at best) to employ correctly, experience has shown that EBO has the potential to suggest COAs that can achieve the desired effects with an economical use of force. 4 In addition, EBO often seeks to avoid the relative simplicity of attrition warfare, and instead seeks to find solutions that either coerce the enemy to stop fighting, or take away his capability to fight. If the United States is to ever enter into conflict with a near-peer competitor who could deny us access to the theater, then EBO could be the solution for planning operations that yields a relatively quick victory with a minimal loss of life on both sides. While the actual operational strategies needed to operate in this environment are beyond the scope of this paper, this paper will show why EBO can help the JFC plan and execute a campaign that would seek to negate any anti-access strategy wherever it may appear, using China as a relevant example.
ANTI-ACCESS/ACCESS DENIAL
In order to fully appreciate the benefits EBO can provide to operations in an anti-access environment, the term -anti-access‖ first needs to be defined. In the monograph Entering the Dragon's Lair: The Implications of Chinese Antiaccess Strategies, Roger Cliff of the RAND Corporation defines anti-access as -any action by an opponent that has the effect of slowing the deployment of friendly forces into a theater, preventing them from operating from certain locations within that theater, or causing them to operate from distances farther from the locus of conflict than they would normally prefer.‖ 5 At its heart, an anti-access strategy is one which seeks to negate the advantages an adversary has and either prevent a confrontation outright or force the enemy to fight on your terms. For example, a robust, layered and redundant integrated air defense system (IADS) that would prevent most aircraft from penetrating a given airspace would be a textbook example of an anti-access strategy. An anti-access strategy does not need to be expensive or at the cutting edge of technology, however. For example, if a belligerent nation possesses a strong navy, laying minefields along key choke points in order to prevent that navy from approaching your coast would be an example of a low-tech anti-access strategy.
One modern example of a country which is rapidly developing an anti-access strategy against the United States is the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). destroying all of the enemy's forces would likely achieve the desired outcome, a more economical use of force can be achieved if key systems are identified, that if destroyed or isolated, will have the same effect as if those systems were destroyed. As an example, if the desired effect is to stop a particular car along the highway, you can destroy the car, destroy the engine, or kill the driver. Destroying the engine might also achieve the desired effect, but depending on the weapon used, the effect might not be immediate, and the car might continue for some time even if the engine were destroyed simply due to inertia. Killing the driver might also achieve the desired effect, but it may require more precision than the other two solutions, and you may have to get closer than you would like in order to be able to hit the driver. Finally, closing down the gas stations along the highway might eventually stop the car, leaving both the driver and car intact, but the time it takes for the car to run out of gas might be unacceptable. In any case, the most important part is the identification of the desired effect, and the analysis of likely outcomes of the various courses of action that were subsequently identified.
CENTERS OF GRAVITY AND EBO
In their series of articles discussing centers of gravity (COG) and critical vulnerabilities, Dr. Joe Strange and Colonel Richard Iron argue that COGs are -physical or moral entities that are the primary components of physical or moral strength, power and resistance‖, and that the three principal ways to defeat the COG are to make COG irrelevant, strip the COG of its support, or to defeat the COG by exploiting a systemic weakness. 14 If one accepts this idea, then it follows that in order to defeat an enemy, is not always necessary to attack their COG directly. Instead, Dr. Strange suggests that exploiting the COG's 14 Joe Strange and Richard Iron, " Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities Part 2: The CG-CC-CR-CV Construct", (1996), 6 vulnerabilities will have the same overall effect as attacking the COG itself and destroying it.
EBO embraces this concept, and seeks to employ power to achieve the desired effects in a manner such that all efforts are employed in concert to achieve the commander's objectives. 15 If the destruction of the COG is the best way to achieve the desired effect, then this is acceptable. But the notion that the COG can be neutralized by less direct means has greater implications for operations in an anti-access environment, where the enemy COG may not be easily attacked, or where its attack may weaken friendly forces to the culminating point.
DESERT STORM
While not the first conflict to employ EBO, Operation Desert Storm stands out for several reasons. Arguably the most important reason is that the opening moves of the campaign were planned such that joint operational fires were (for the most part) not simply employed against the bulk of the front-line Iraqi fielded forces, but instead were employed against a variety of targets that would ultimately have much more far reaching effects than simply the destruction of the Iraqi armed forces. Brigadier General Deptula states in his article Effects-Based Operations: Change in the Nature of Warfare,
The air campaign strategy capitalized on capabilities and highly adaptive attack plans designed to paralyze Saddam's control of forces, then went on to neutralize the enemy's capacity to fight, undermine its will to fight, reduce its military production base, and create the conditions to control its capacity to build weapons of mass destruction. This construct avoided Iraq's strengths on the ground-its vast defensive armies that had the potential to inflict high Coalition casualties.
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By employing EBO concepts against targets in a parallel manner in which a broad range of targets were struck at nearly the same time, the Coalition was able to rapidly isolate 
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF)
Whereas EBO in Operation Desert Storm was primarily used to employ air power in order to neutralize a fielded combat force, more recent examples of EBO illustrate how both lethal and non-lethal forces can be employed together in a coordinated manner. In the 24 giving both the input and output from the board visibility at the highest level within the task force. Once the desired effect was identified and the resources were allocated against the target, the results were analyzed in a manner similar to more traditional battle damage assessment (BDA) and the cycle began again. The CJTF-180 example illustrates an employment of EBO where it was integrated at the task force level with command oversight at the highest levels. In addition, CJTF-180 was able take EBO past the level of simply selecting targets, and was able to integrate both lethal and non-lethal means to achieve the desired ends.
THE UTILITY OF EBO
Based on the two previous examples, it's apparent that EBO has tremendous potential to be effective across the entire range of military operations (ROMO). On one hand, the 
THE FACTORS OF TIME AND SPACE
One of the greatest challenges that the JFC can face in an anti-access environment is In the example of a belligerent China, the long distance from friendly basing to the joint operating area (JOA) would present a tremendous burden on the JFC from both an operational and logistical standpoint. If one were to presume that in a worst-case scenario, effective force to defend Taiwan. With these extreme distances, the JFC would be forced to employ a relatively small force limited to land based air power and sea based air power positioned outside Chinese TBM range. This would be further hampered by the requirement for tanker support on such long missions. By employing EBO in the design and execution of a long distance air and maritime campaign, the JFC could mitigate the risk to mission incurred by possessing a much smaller force than desired. By leveraging the capabilities of precision strikes and stealth, the JFC could achieve the same effects with a much smaller force, similar to the results seen in Operation Desert Storm.
AVOIDING ATTRITION WARFARE
In the Desert Storm example, the use of precision strikes and stealth was shown to be the key to designing a campaign which required less force than might otherwise be needed by the more conventional means at the time. However, simply throwing small numbers of precision strikes around from air and sea platforms is not enough. EBO would suggest that a numerically overwhelming force is not required, and it would also suggest the methods in which that smaller force could be employed effectively. Looking back on the Desert Storm example, the greatest effects were achieved by selectively targeting a wide range of targets with precision strikes in order to neutralize the Iraqi capability to defend themselves and attack coalition forces. If one accepts Dr. Strange's notion of a COG and its vulnerabilities, then in a China-Taiwan scenario the anti-access measures themselves could be considered a COG at the operational level. Clearly, a deeply layered IADS and a carrier-killing TBM are 30 The PRC do possess ballistic missiles that can strike Guam, but they have nuclear, not conventional warheads dynamic, positive agents that are powerful and strike heavy, effective blows, 31 and hence would be considered a COG in this example. However, due to their very nature, most of China's anti-access measures are not readily attacked, at least not directly. Most of China's offensive anti-access capabilities, such as their TBMs and modern fighters, are situated within or behind a robust IADS, so directly attacking them would be difficult.
If the JFC determines the anti-access measures to be one of the COGs that need to be destroyed in order to defend Taiwan from invasion, then the JFC would need to develop a strategy which would allow that destruction with the forces available. EBO could aid the JFC in developing and executing a strategy which would use the available forces, taking into account the time and space tradeoffs, and employ them in such a way as to neutralize the enemy's anti-access measures without reverting to a classic -slugfest‖ of massive strikes designed to wear down the enemy defenses at a high cost to both sides.
THE CASE AGAINST EBO
While EBO has been quite successful in both past and current conflicts, there is considerable opposition to EBO. 42 However, EBO is not a prescribed set of steps that one must follow in order to be successful. EBO is a conceptual approach to planning and conducting operations.
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General Mattis also implies that EBO takes the commander out of the loop of the planning and execution cycle, with staffs waging the war. 44 Since EBO is not a prescriptive process that has been codified into a series of steps and instructions, any lack of leadership visibility in the process should be directed at the commander, not the concept. As Major Herndon said in his Field Artillery article, -The key to CJTF-180's successfully executing EBO was the focus on effects achieved by the process-not the process itself. At times, CJTF-180 planners got mired in the process and ignored the effects being generated, thus they failed to adapt to the ever-changing enemy and take advantage of the effects they could have created. They believe, however, that the underlying principles of EBO contradict the classical Clausewitzian concepts of operational art. For instance, they believe that EBO confuses the relationship between clearly defined ends and the use of available means to achieve those ends. 49 Furthermore, they argue that EBO has muddied the waters and has created confusion by introducing non-standard terminology, which in turn causes the defense community to become distracted and lose focus on the foundations of operational art. 50 The problem is that they appear to be unwilling to acknowledge that EBO has proved successful in the past. Dr. 
CONCLUSION
If the United States ever finds itself fighting an enemy that has developed a robust anti-access strategy that seeks to counter our ability to project, the JFC will certainly be in an unenviable position. On the one hand, the JFC will have to develop and execute a plan that takes into consideration considerable time and space limitations, especially if operations are in a maritime theater. Extreme distances, long transit times and limited basing will be just a few of the problems the JFC will face. On the other hand, the JFC will likely have a relatively small force to plan and conduct the campaign with, at least initially. Despite its recent criticism, EBO has a proven track record of successful employment across the ROMO and has great potential for use in situations such as these. EBO is a concept which can aid the JFC in developing and executing COAs that can effectively utilize all elements of power in a coordinated and synchronized manner. The misconceptions surrounding EBO stem from the incorrect belief that EBO is a process, rather than a concept. 
